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Abstract
It is widely acknowledged that re sales were a critical factor in inducing and exacer-
bating the nancial crises of 2007{2008. The leverage of nancial intermediaries, which is
dened as the ratio of total assets to capital, is a key factor in causing re sales. Why
do nancial intermediaries expand their balance sheets despite subsequently having to sell
their assets at discounted prices? To examine this question, we incorporate nancial inter-
mediaries into a three-period incomplete market economy model, in which households face
countercyclical and uninsured idiosyncratic income shocks. We demonstrate that counter-
cyclical income inequality and market incompleteness result in leveraged investment and
subsequent asset re sales by nancial intermediaries in equilibrium. The rst contribution
of this paper is that we demonstrate that the mechanism between asset prices and leverages
could successfully solve the famed asset-pricing puzzles. The second contribution is that we
analyze the impact of nancial regulation on the welfare of ex ante homogeneous households.
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re sales; income inequality; incomplete markets; lever-
aged investments; precautionary demand for assets.
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1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that re sales were a critical factor in inducing and exacerbating the
nancial crises of 2007{2008. Fire sales are forced sales of an asset that disconnect the asset price
from its potential fundamental value; they occur when the seller cannot pay his/her debt without
selling the asset. The leverage of nancial intermediaries, which is dened as the ratio of total
assets to capital, is a particularly important cause of re sales. There is a vast literature on the
limits of arbitrage that investigates how re sales by nancial intermediaries aect equilibrium
asset prices. Recently, however, some researchers have begun to pay serious attention to the
potential role of income inequality in the recent nancial crises.
Why do nancial intermediaries expand their balance sheets even though they subsequently
have to sell their assets at discounted prices? To answer this question, we incorporate nancial
intermediaries into a three-period incomplete market economy model, in which households face
countercyclical and uninsured idiosyncratic income shocks. Households, who are not specialists
in trading risky assets, can hold risky assets in their portfolios but incur costs in changing
them. Financial intermediaries are owned by households and their values are determined by a
competitive market. They have a comparative advantage in trading risky assets, as they can
trade them at no cost. Thus, nancial intermediaries nance their positions by using the capital
that they provide themselves and by borrowing from households. This borrowing takes the
form of noncontingent short-term risk-free bonds, which households can trade at no cost. That
is, nancial intermediaries make leveraged investments. There are two important additional
sources of frictions. First, a margin requirement regulation or a leverage constraint limits the
use of leverage by nancial intermediaries in relation to some multiple of their capital. Second,
nancial intermediaries can only build their capital by retaining earnings from their trading
prots. That is, once a negative aggregate shock hits the economy, the margin requirement
regulation may require nancial intermediaries to sell their assets instead of raising new capital.
In this case, they have to sell their risky assets to households, who require that the prices of
risky assets should be suciently discounted. As a result, re sales by the nancial intermediaries
occur.
We demonstrate that an equilibrium occurs as a result of the linkages between countercycli-
cal income inequality, market incompleteness, and the leverage of nancial intermediaries. In
particular, this paper explains why nancial intermediaries prefer investing in risky assets and
borrowing by issuing risk-free bonds. Countercyclicality implies that dividends from risky assets,
which are aected by aggregate economic conditions, decrease when many households suer from
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the loss of their idiosyncratic labor endowments.1 As is well known, such risky assets generate
high-risk premiums. In addition, because market incompleteness cannot exclude arbitrage oppor-
tunities, the nancial intermediaries can gain prots from the leveraged investment. This paper
demonstrates that the countercyclical income inequality and market incompleteness generate
both high-risk premiums and arbitrage opportunities for the nancial intermediaries.
The rst contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the mechanism between asset
prices and leverage could solve the famed asset-pricing puzzles. Countercyclical idiosyncratic
endowment shocks generate lower risk-free rates and higher equity premiums compared with the
representative agent model, as long as households have a precautionary demand for assets. In
addition, asset re sales by nancial intermediaries generate higher volatility of equity prices
than those of rational for dividend uctuations. That is, our model is not only consistent with
the evidence of recent nancial crises but also simultaneously solves the equity premium puzzle
and the excess volatility puzzle.
The second contribution of this paper is to analyze the impact of nancial regulation on the
welfare of ex ante homogeneous households. The Basel III international regulatory framework
for banks, nalized in December 2017, regulates the portfolio construction of nancial interme-
diaries. Many researchers and policy makers regard such nancial regulation as an important
instrument to prevent nancial crises. Our model enables us to examine the role of the nancial
intermediaries as the providers of liquidity or safe assets. As labor endowments correlate with
the aggregate dividends, the households prefer holding risk-free bonds to risky assets. In other
words, the rise in the nancial intermediaries' leverage can be considered as a rise in the self-
insurance opportunities for the households. Therefore, the high leverage and the following re
sales are not always harmful for welfare. In fact, we demonstrate that there exists an optimal
rate for the margin requirement in terms of the welfare of ex ante homogeneous households.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our paper to the existing literature.
Section 3 describes the model setup and section 4 characterizes the competitive equilibrium.
Section 5 solves the equilibrium numerically and discusses the results. Finally, Section 6 provides
the conclusion.
1We can interpret such assets as subprime mortgage-backed securities because subprime borrowers default,
leading to the simultaneous collapse of the mortgage-backed securities during recessions.
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2 Related Literature
The leverage of nancial intermediaries, which is dened as the ratio of total assets to equity,
is key to understanding re sales and nancial crises.2 Adrian and Shin (2010a, b) point out
that the balance sheets of the nancial intermediaries expanded signicantly prior to the 2007{
2008 nancial crisis. They emphasize the role of the balance sheets of investment banks, which
were continuously marked to market. In addition, Brunnermeier (2009) describes events during
the crisis in detail and emphasizes the role of nancial intermediaries' balance sheets in causing
re sales. These studies indicate that the balance sheet expansions of the nancial intermedi-
aries, associated with leveraged investment, and the subsequent shrinkage of the balance sheets,
associated with re sales, triggered the nancial crisis.
There is a vast theoretical literature emphasizing the role of the leverage of nancial inter-
mediaries or specialized investors in causing re sales. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997,
2011), Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009), He and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), and Dow and Han (2017) study a nancial econ-
omy and consider limited arbitrage to be the source of re sales.3 In these models, nancial
securities, which are properly understood only by the specialized investors, are traded. If these
investors become severely capital-constrained, they have to sell these nancial securities to the
nonspecialist investors at discounted prices. Although these models emphasize the role of spe-
cialized investors, they treat households in a simple manner. For example, Aiyagari and Gertler
(1999) and He and Krishnamurthy (2012) consider the representative household. He and Krish-
namurthy (2013) consider two types of households that dier in their portfolio choices, but pool
wealth and distribute it equally in each period. Thus, the wealth distribution of the households
plays no role in solving the equilibrium.
Some studies propose an alternative view in which the recent nancial crises are attributed to
the heterogeneity of households. Traditionally, such heterogeneity has been considered a potential
resolution to the various asset-pricing puzzles. For example, Mankiw (1986) considers an economy
in which there is income inequality and the insurance market is incomplete. He demonstrates
that high equity premiums are generated when aggregate shocks aect all individuals ex ante
2Leverage and re sales are important in nancial markets even during normal periods. For example, Phillipon
(2015) demonstrates that the quantity of intermediated assets and the income of the nancial sectors in relation
to GDP have risen rapidly since 1980. Phillipon also shows that the unit cost of nancial intermediation has
remained stable around 2%. This implies that the continuous balance sheet expansions explain the continuous
increase in the income shares of the nancial sectors in relation to GDP. Coval and Staord (2007) demonstrate
that re sales are actually observed in equity markets even in normal periods. They nd that nancially distressed
mutual funds are forced to sell securities in response to withdrawals by their investors.
3Lorenzoni (2008) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) study a production economy in which the specialized
investors, which possess linear technology, need outside funds to invest in capital. They demonstrate that the re
sales occur when these investors have to sell their capital to consumers who are not specialists in managing it.
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but are concentrated among a few ex post.4 Rajan (2010) argues that income inequality played a
potential role in causing and exacerbating the recent nancial crises. Some empirical studies nd
a signicant relationship between rising income inequality, credit growth, and the frequency of
nancial crises.5 Kumhof et al. (2015) present a general equilibrium model in which the growing
income share of high-income households results in higher leverage for low-income households and
subsequent nancial crises. However, in their model, high-income households are assumed to have
an inherent preference for holding assets and the role of nancial intermediaries is abstracted
away.
This literature review provides the background context for the research question that we
address, namely, is there any link between income inequality and the leverage and re sales
of nancial intermediaries? In other words, we ask, are the two hypotheses in the literature
regarding the causes of nancial crises and re sales|one emphasizing the leverage of the nancial
intermediaries and the other focusing on income inequality|independent of each other? In
this paper, we investigate this issue by introducing nancial intermediaries into a model of
heterogeneous households.
Considering heterogeneous households naturally involves exploring the nancial constraints
that limit risk sharing among the households. This study assumes that assets markets are
exogenously incomplete and that households face liquidity constraints. In contrast, some studies
assume that households' borrowings are limited endogenously. For example, Kehoe and Levein
(1993, 2001), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), and Kruger and Perri (2006) consider an economy
where household borrowings are endogenously limited due to enforcement problems. Chien
and Lustig (2010), Araujo et al. (2012), Geanakaplos and Zame (2014), Gottardi and Kubler
(2015), and Fostel and Geanakaplos (2015) consider the role of collateral in limited enforcement
environments. In these models, although asset markets are complete, the enforcement problem
limits risk sharing among the households. As demonstrated in Alvarez and Jermann (2000)
and Chien and Lustig (2010), stochastic discount factors (SDFs) used to price the securities are
unique in these complete market economies. The uniqueness of SDFs implies that there are
4Storesletten et al. (2004), Krueger and Perri (2006), and Guvenen et al. (2014) provide evidence regarding
income inequality in the US. In particular, Storesletten et al. (2004) and Guvenen et al. (2015) provide evidence
that idiosyncratic income inequality is countercyclical in the US. Constantinides and Due (1996) and Constan-
tinides and Ghosh (2017) demonstrate that a model with uninsured idiosyncratic income shocks provides a good
t for the time-series averages of asset prices.
5Bordo and Meissner (2012) use cross-country OECD data and nd a signicant relationship between credit
growth and the frequency of nancial crises. However, they demonstrate that there is no signicant relationship
between credit growth (the change in the log ratio of bank loans to the price index) and changes in the share of
income for the top 1% of the income distribution. However, subsequent studies, such as Gu and Huang (2014) and
Perugini et al. (2016), examine the robustness of their results and demonstrate that there is indeed a signicant
relationship. In addition, Yamarik (2016) nds a positive relationship between rising income inequality and real
estate lending across the US.
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no arbitrage opportunities in the nancial markets. Although these models are tractable, the
no-arbitrage environments make it impossible to examine the role of arbitragers. This paper
assumes that markets are exogenously incomplete and that households are subject to liquidity
constraints, as assumed by Bewley (1983), Hugget (1992), and Aiyagari (1994). In this paper,
market incompleteness violates the uniqueness of SDFs and generates arbitrage opportunities,
which results in leveraged investment by nancial intermediaries.
This paper is related the literature investigating the role of margins or collateral requirements
in borrowing and lending, where the leverage and the asset prices are simultaneously determined
in an equilibrium. For example, Chien and Lustig (2010), Araujo et al. (2012), Geanakaplos and
Zame (2014), Gottardi and Kubler (2015), and Fostel and Geanakaplos (2015) consider the col-
lateral general equilibrium, where one security is used as a collateral for other securities. In these
models, the possibility of future default limits the capacity for current borrowing. In addition,
the margin requirement constraints in Gromb and Vayanos (2002) require that arbitragers hold
enough in their current margin account to ensure that risky assets take a positive value in the
next period. On the other hand, based on the institutional features in actual nancial markets,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) and Daw and Han (2018) assume that the total margin on
the nancial intermediaries' current position cannot exceed their current capital. In a similar
fashion to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) and Dow and Han (2018), we assume that regu-
lation places a lower limit on the margin ratio required, which is dened as the ratio of current
capital to the current holdings of equity shares. In our model, margin requirement constraints
always bind due to the arbitrage opportunities and the margin ratio is xed in equilibrium.6
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature that provides disaster explanations for the
equity premium puzzle, including Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006). In the disaster models, both
per capita real consumption (or GDP) and equity prices fall sharply when disasters occur; the
negative correlation between equity returns and SDFs or the intertemporal marginal rates of
substitution (IMRS) of the representative agent is magnied, and thus, large equity premiums
arise. Apart from investigations of empirical plausibility, such as Julliard and Ghosh (2012) and
Nakamura et al. (2013), the disaster explanation of equity premiums is theoretically controversial.
For example, Gourio (2008) and Saito and Suzuki (2014) demonstrate that, depending on the
assumption regarding the time-series properties of the disaster and the intertemporal elasticities
6Brumn et al. (2015) construct a model with heterogeneous agents, collateral constraints, and multiple collat-
eralized assets. Then, they explain why margin requirement regulations on leverage have an insignicant impact
on stock price volatility in US. On the other hand, with the xed margin ratio in our model, a change in margin
requirement regulations directly causes a change in asset prices. Although this result is contrary to Brumn et al.
(2015), we employ this specication because of its tractability.
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of substitution, the equity prices rise sharply when disasters occur.7 Leverage and re sales
played a critical role in decreasing asset prices during the Great Depression and other nancial
crises. Nevertheless, they play no role in the disaster models. Therefore, the consumption-based
asset-pricing model with leverage and re sales considered in this paper enables us to examine the
question: does a decline in equity prices due to re sales properly explain asset prices, including
the equity premium?
3 The Model
There are three periods, 0, 1, and 2, and two types of agents of equal mass, households and
nancial intermediaries. There are two types of assets, risk-free bonds and risky shares of a
single \Lucas tree".
Figure 1 shows the timing of events. A Lucas tree produces dividends in each period, which
are denoted by fd0; dj1; dj2g. j is an aggregate state and it is common across households and
nancial intermediaries. The Lucas tree pays a certain dividend, d0, in period 0. In period 1, a
normal state, j = n, occurs with a probability of 1    and the Lucas tree produces dividends
dn1 and d
n
2 in periods 1 and 2, respectively. On the other hand, a bad state, j = b, occurs with a
probability of  and the Lucas tree produces dividends db1 and d
b
2 in periods 1 and 2, respectively.
Note that the dividend in the bad state, db1, is lower than that in the normal state, d
n
1 .
Households receive labor endowments in each period, which are denoted by fe0; en1 ; en2 ; eb1i; eb2ig.
i is an idiosyncratic state that aects the labor endowments. The households receive a certain
labor endowment, e0, in period 0. If a normal state, j = n, occurs in period 1, all households
receive the same labor endowments, en1 and e
n
2 , in periods 1 and 2, respectively. If a bad state,
j = b, occurs in period 1, a fraction of households, 1    , receives high endowments, eb1h and
eb2h, in periods 1 and 2, respectively, whereas the remaining fraction,  households, receives low
endowments, eb1l and e
b
2l, in periods 1 and 2, respectively. As the population of households is
normalized to unity, the fractions of households 1    and  correspond to the probability of
drawing idiosyncratic states i = h and l.
Suppose that there is no uncertainty between periods 1 and 2.
[Figure 1]
7Such sharp rises in equity prices at the beginning of disasters were actually observed during World War II
(Jorion and Goetzmann 1999, Oosterlinck 2010, and Suzuki 2012.)
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3.1 Households
Households maximize their expected utility function subject to budget and liquidity constraints,
as follows:
max
fc0;cn1 ;cn2 ;cb1i;cb2i;s1;sn2 ;sb2i;f1;fn2 ;fb2igi2fh;lg
u(c0) + E0
h
u(cj1i)  ajipj1
(sj2i   s1)2
2
+ u(cj2i)
i
; (1)
subject to c0 + p0s1 + q0f1 = (p0 + d0)s0 + f0 +D0 + e0;
cn1 + p
n
1 s
n
2 + q
n
1 f
n
2 = (p
n
1 + d
n
1 )s1 + f1 +D
n
1 + e
n
1 ;
cn2 = d
n
2 s
n
2 + f
n
2 +D
n
2 + e
n
2 ;
cb1i + p
b
1s
b
2i + q
b
1f
b
2i = (p
b
1 + d
b
1)s1 + f1 +D
j
1 + e
b
1i;
cb2i = d
b
2s
b
2i + f
b
2i +D
b
2 + e
b
2i;
f1  0; fn2  0; and f b2i  0: (2)
Let fc0; cn1 ; cn2 ; cb1i; cb2ig, fs0; s1; sn2 ; sb2ig, and ff0; f1; fn2 ; f b2ig denote consumption, holdings of
Lucas tree shares, and holdings of risk-free bonds, respectively, in periods 0, 1, and 2, in the
aggregate states j = n and b, and in the idiosyncratic states i = h and l. Let fp0; pj1g and
fq0; qj1g denote the prices of the Lucas tree and the prices of risk-free bonds, respectively, in
periods 0 and 1 and in states j = n and b. Let fD0; Dj1; Dj2g denote the dividend payments
from nancial intermediaries in periods 0, 1, and 2 and states j = n and b.  2 (0; 1) is a
subjective time discount factor. Households are risk averse and the periodic utility function is
twice dierentiable: u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0. E0[] denotes the expectation operator, conditional
on the time 0 information.
As households are not specialists in trading equity shares, they derive disutility from trading
equity shares in period 1. We use a quadratic cost function because of its tractability. However,
it also captures the following idea. Suppose that the household has a xed amount of time to
either trade securities or enjoy leisure. As more securities are sold or bought, households must
sell or buy increasingly illiquid assets. Large trading volumes require a large amount of time.
Diminishing marginal utility of leisure could lead to convex costs of trading securities, which
could be approximated by a quadratic cost function. aji denotes the coecient of the cost arising
from trading in shares. Note that, in equation (1), the cost arising from trading in shares is
dierent due to their idiosyncratic state. In what follows, we will discuss the details of this
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assumption.
Because idiosyncratic labor endowments cannot be observed and seized by the other agent,
households cannot trade state-contingent contracts against idiosyncratic endowment shocks.
Therefore, the only traded assets are risky equity shares of a Lucas tree and noncontingent
bonds. In addition, this lack of pledgeability of the labor endowment prevents households from
issuing risk-free bonds. Thus, the inequalities (2) are the liquidity constraints.
3.2 Financial Intermediaries
There are homogeneous and competitive nancial intermediaries owned by the households. They
maximize the expected discounted value of dividend payments subject to the budget constraints,
the margin requirement or the leverage constraints, and the dividend constraints:
max
fsj1 ;sj2 ;fj1 ;fj2 ;D0;Dj1;Dj2gj2fn;bg
D0 + E0
h
M j1
 
Dj1 +M
j
2D
j
2
i
; (3)
subject to (p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0 = p0s

1 + q0f

1 +D0; (4)
(pj1 + d
j
1)s

1 + f

1 = p
j
1s
j
2 + q
j
1f
j
2 +D
j
1; (5)
dj2s
j
2 + f
j
2 = D
j
2; (6)
(p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0  D0
  p0s1; (7)
(pj1 + d
j
1)s
j
1 + f
j
1  Dj1
  pj1sj2 ; (8)
D0  0; Dj1  0; and Dj2  0: (9)
Let fs0; sj1 ; sj2 g and ff0 ; fj1 ; fj2 g denote the intermediaries' holdings of shares and risk-free
bonds, respectively, in periods 0, 1, and 2 in the aggregate states j = n and b. Let fM j0 ;M j1 ;M j2
denote the SDFs used for the market value of the nancial intermediaries.
The equations (4), (5), and (6) are the budget constraints. Based on their capital holdings
at the beginning of each period (the left-hand side), the intermediaries choose their nancial
positions and the dividends paid to the households (the right-hand side).
The inequalities (7) and (8) are margin requirement constraints or leverage constraints. Here-
after, we use leverage constraints throughout the paper. Although the intermediaries can ex-
change securities at no cost, the leverage constraints restrict how they can construct their port-
folios. In particular, the fraction  2 (0; 1) of the intermediaries' holding capital (the right-hand
side) should be backed by their own ex-dividend capital (the left-hand side).
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We refer to the inequalities (9) as dividend constraints, which require that the dividend
payments to the households should not be negative. In other words, issuing new equity is
prohibitively expensive, and it follows that dividend payments cannot be negative.
3.3 Market-Clearing Conditions
The market-clearing conditions for goods are as follows:
c0 = y0  e0 + d0; cn1 = yn1  en1 + dn1 ; cn2 = yn2  en1 + dn1
(1   )cb1h +  cb1l = yb1  (1   )eb1h +  eb1l + db1; (10)
and (1   )cb2h +  cb2l = yb2  (1   )eb2h +  eb2l + db2; (11)
where y0, y
n
1 , y
n
2 , y
b
1, and y
b
2 denote the aggregate endowments.
The total number of shares is normalized to unity. The market-clearing conditions for shares
are as follows:
s0 + s

0 = 1; s1 + s

1 = 1; s
n
2 + s

2 = 1; and (1   )sb2h +  sb2l + sb2 = 1: (12)
There are no external bonds. The market-clearing conditions for risk-free bonds are as follows:
f0 + f

0 = 0; f1 + f

1 = 0; f
n
2 + f

2 = 0; and (1   )f b2h +  f b2l + fb2 = 0:
3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
Our denition of the competitive equilibrium is as follows.
Denition 1 For j = n and b and i = h and l, and for the given endowments, fe0; en1 ; en2 ; eb1i; eb2ig,
the dividend of the Lucas tree, fd0; dj1; dj2g, and the initial level of equity shares and risk-
free bonds, fs0; f0; s0; f0 g, the competitive equilibrium is dened as the consumption allocation,
fc0; cn1 ; cn2 ; cb1i; cb2ig, the households' portfolio, fs1; sn2 ; sb2ig and ff1; fn2 ; f b2ig, the nancial interme-
diaries' dividend payments, fD0; Dj1; Dj2g, the nancial intermediaries' portfolios, fs1; sj2 g and
ff1 ; fj2 g, and the asset prices fp0; pj1g and fq0; qj1g that simultaneously solve the households' and
intermediaries' optimization problems, and satisfy the market-clearing conditions.
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3.5 Assumptions
Three additional assumptions will be useful in the analysis. First, we make an assumption
regarding the coecient of equity adjustment costs, aji .
Assumption 1 ani equals au
0(cn1 ) and a
b
i equals au
0(cb1i), which the households take as given
when they solve the utility maximization problem. Suppose that a is a constant parameter.
The specication for the adjustment costs of equity transactions follows Heaton and Lucas
(1996) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1999). In particular, it implies that the disutility of low-
endowment households is higher than that of high-endowment households if their trading volumes
are the same. This is because the consumption of low-endowment households is lower than that
of high-endowment households in period 1 and state b. The logic behind this assumption is as
follows: low-endowment households may be unemployed or paid relatively low wages and they
must spend many hours seeking a new job or working harder, given their low wages. Therefore,
they incur more severe disutility from trading securities, which requires large amounts of time.8
Second, we make an assumption of idiosyncratic endowments.
Assumption 2 Low-endowment households have lower endowments than those of high-endowment
households and relatively upward-sloping income proles compared with those of high-endowment
households: eb1h > e
b
1l; and
eb1l
eb1h
<
eb2l
eb2h
. Moreover, the income proles of low-endowment house-
holds are suciently upward sloping that the liquidity constraints of low-endowment households
always bind.
The assumption states that idiosyncratic income risk is countercyclical because state b rep-
resents a recession in our setting. Mankiw (1986) demonstrates that this countercyclical income
risk can resolve the equity premium puzzle. From an empirical point of view, Storesletten et
al. (2004) and Guvenen et al. (2014) provide evidence that idiosyncratic income risks are coun-
tercyclical in the US. Our endowment structure model incorporates the countercyclical income
risks in a simple manner.
8Our assumption draws on that of Aiyagari and Gertler (1999). They introduce adjustment costs into the utility
function, and assume that the coecient equals the marginal utility of ex post aggregate consumption. However,
adjustment costs are not heterogeneous because they employ the representative agent framework. On the other
hand, Heaton and Lucas (1999) consider a heterogeneous household model and introduce quadratic adjustment
costs in budget constraints. They also assume that the coecient is constant. However, when households solve
the utility maximization problem subject to the budget constraints, the Lagrangian multiplier, which equals the
marginal utility of income, is associated with the budget constraints. That is, heterogeneous households evaluate
the adjustment costs in terms of their own marginal utility of income. As a result, their adjustment costs are the
same as in our paper. Our specication that the heterogeneous adjustment cost enters the utility function rather
than the budget constraints enables us to discuss the existence of the equilibrium analytically.
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Finally, we make an assumption regarding the SDF of the nancial intermediaries.
Assumption 3 M b2 is bounded:
1
qb1
 1
M b2
 1

db2
pb1
 
 1

  1
 1
qb1
: (13)
The assumption indicates that the inverse of the nancial intermediaries' SDF, M b2 , lies
between the risk-free rate and the rate of return on the leveraged portfolio. The nancial in-
termediaries use the household IMRS as the SDF because they are owned by the households.
However, there are no unique and proper candidates for M b2 because the nancial markets are
incomplete between periods 1 and 2 in state b. We do not replace M b2 with one of those can-
didates but make an assumption regarding the upper and lower bounds of the candidate. The
term on the left-hand side of the inequality (13) is the risk-free rate, whereas the term on the
right-hand side is the rate of return on the leveraged portfolio. Because the rates of return on
the leveraged portfolio are higher than the risk-free rates in general, this assumption requires
that the M b2 takes a reasonable value.
9
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Asset Prices
Using the households' rst-order conditions, we can derive the relationship between asset prices
and the households' IMRS. Although households face liquidity constraints, they do not incur
costs when adjusting their holdings of risk-free bonds. The unconstrained household IMRS
determine the risk-free prices in the standard manner: q0 = (1 )n1 +b1 and qn1 = n2 , where
n1   u
0(cn1 )
u0(c0)
, n2   u
0(cn2 )
u0(cn1 )
, and b1   (1  )u
0(cb1h)+ u
0(cb1l)
u0(c0)
. Because Assumption 1 ensures
that high-endowment households have no incentive to borrow, the IMRS of the high-endowment
households, which have the strongest motivation to save, determine the risk-free prices in state
b. That is:
qb1 = 
b
2h  b2l; (14)
where b2h   u
0(cb2h)
u0(cb1h)
and b2l   u
0(cb2l)
u0(cb1l)
.
9Note that we do not assume that the leveraged portfolio rates of return are higher than the risk-free rates:
1
qb1
 1

db2
pb1
 

1

  1

1
qb1
. This inequality actually occurs in an equilibrium, as demonstrated later.
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By using the rst-order conditions with respect to shares, we can derive the following con-
ditions: p0 = (1   )n1
 
dn1 + 
n
2 d
n
2

+ b1
 
db1 +
~b2d
b
2

, where ~b2   (1  )u
0(cb2h)+ u
0(cb2l)
(1  )u0(cb1h)+ u0(cb1l)
. ~b2
denotes the ex ante homogeneous households' expected IMRS between periods 1 and 2 in state
b. Note that ~b2 is used for pricing the dividends d
b
2 in period 0.
The equity prices in period 1 can be characterized by using the households' rst-order con-
ditions and the nancial intermediaries' constraints.
Lemma 1 For pj1  j2dj2, where b2  
h
(1  )u0(cb2h)
u0(cb1h)
+ 
u0(cb2l)
u0(cb1l)
i
, the following inequality holds:
pj1  pj1. That is, pj1 is the highest possible value of equity prices. If the leverage constraints bind
in period 1 and state j under the equity prices pj1 = p
j
1, then the equity prices can be written as
follows:
pj1 =
pj1 + a(d
j
1s

1 + f

1 )
  a(1  )s1
: (15)
It is unique if and only if the following condition is satised:
pj1
1 + as1
>  d
j
1s

1 + f

1
s1
: (16)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This asset-pricing mechanism was originally analyzed by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999). The
intuition behind Lemma 1 is as follows. If the equity prices are pj1 = 
j
2d
j
2, households have
no incentive to trade equity shares with the nancial intermediaries. For instance, in state b,
pb1 = 
b
2d
b
2 implies that the supply of equity shares of the low-endowment households equals the
demand for equity shares by the high-endowment households. There is no supply for the nancial
intermediaries. If the nancial intermediaries can maintain their current equity shares, sj2 = s

1,
under pj1 = p
j
1, they would be realized as equilibrium equity prices. On the other hand, if the
leverage and dividend constraints prevent them from maintaining the current equity shares, they
have to shed securities, to the point where they are just able to satisfy the constraints. As it is
costly for the households to absorb the equity shares, pj1 will drop below p
j
1.
The following inequality is convenient for investigating the optimal portfolio choice of the
nancial intermediaries.
Lemma 2 When the liquidity constraints bind, the following inequality holds:
qb1  b2  ~b2: (17)
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If the liquidity constraints do not bind, and the IMRS are equalized between the two types of
households, then qb1 = 
b
2 =
~b2 holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The left inequality qb1  b2 has the following implications. If the equity prices equal qb1db2,
there are no arbitrage opportunities between the risk-free bonds and the equities. We refer to qb1d
b
2
as the fundamental equity prices. The inequalities (17) in Lemma 2 indicate that qb1d
b
2  b2db2,
which implies that the actual equity prices are lower than the fundamental equity prices. This
is because the low-endowment households sell their equity shares to raise their consumption in
period 1 and state b. The high-endowment households, which would like to save, buy the equity
shares but require that the prices are discounted because of the adjustment cost. In other words,
the decrease in equity prices from the fundamental level in period 1 and state b is caused by the
re sales conducted by the low-endowment households. Note that qb1 equals 
b
2 if there are no
liquidity constraints or any market incompleteness.
The right inequality b2  ~b2 has the following implications. ~b2 is the ex ante homogeneous
households' expected IMRS between periods 1 and 2; it is used for pricing db2 in the determination
of p0. On the other hand, 
b
2 is the weighted average of the ex post heterogeneous households'
IMRS; it is used for pricing db2 in the determination of p
b
1. 
b
2  ~b2 is derived from the het-
erogeneity in the adjustment costs from trading equity shares. The high-endowment households
have higher IMRS because they have lower adjustment costs. Thus, the right inequality holds.
Note that b2 equals
~b2 if the adjustment costs are homogeneous among households.
4.2 Financial Intermediaries' Portfolio
Based on the asset price relationship derived above, we can derive the nancial intermediaries'
portfolio. Figure 2 displays the portfolio that the nancial intermediaries could choose in period
0, on a plane where the horizontal axis is s1 and the vertical axis is f

1 .
The downward-sloping line passing through the origin labeled Leverage constraint in period
0 in Figure 2 illustrates the following relationship: Incorporating the budget constraints of the
nancial intermediaries (4) into the leverage constraints (7) and rearranging them, we obtain
the inequality q0f

1   (1   )p0s1. This indicates the upper limit of the risk-free bonds that
the intermediaries can issue is equal to the fraction 1    of their equity holdings. This can be
reformulated as follows:
f1   (1  )
p0
q0
s1; (18)
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That is, the more equity holdings that the nancial intermediaries choose, the more risk-free
bonds they can issue.
The downward-sloping line labeled Dividend constraint in period 0 in Figure 2 illustrates the
following relationship: By substituting the budget constraints (4) into the dividend nonnegativity
constraints, D0  0, we can derive the following inequality: (p0+d0)s0+f0  p0s1  q0f1 . That
is, the holdings of the risk-free bonds cannot exceed the initial capital holdings minus the equity
purchases. This can reformulated as follows:
f1   
p0
q0
s1 +
(p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0
q0
: (19)
Therefore, the more equity holdings that the nancial intermediaries choose, the fewer risk-free
bonds they can hold.
Now, we can determine the range of the portfolio s1 and f

1 , where the leverage constraints
bind in period 1 and state j. Suppose that the nancial intermediaries' net assets evaluated at the
equity prices pj1 are not sucient to permit them to satisfy the leverage constraint, pay dividends,
and maintain their current holding of equity, sj2 = s

1. In this case, they must reduce dividends
to zero because the inequality

(pj1 + d
j
1)s

1 + f
j
1 + D
j
1

< pj1s

1 holds. Furthermore, suppose
that the leverage constraints under the equity prices still bind

(pj1 + d
j
1)s

1 + f
j
1

< pj1s

1. In
this case, they must shed securities to the point where they are just able to satisfy the leverage
constraints. This can be reformulated as follows:
f1 <  

dj1 + (1  )pj1

s1: (20)
If the intermediaries' portfolios satisfy the inequality (20) in period 0, the leverage constraints
in period 1 in state j bind. That is, re sales by the nancial intermediaries occur.
For concreteness, we focus on the case where the leverage constraints bind in state b. The
following Lemma 3 concerns this case.
Lemma 3 If the leverage constraint could bind in state b, it could not bind in state n as long as
s1  0. That is:
(1  )p0
q0
> db1 + (1  )pb1 (21)
) dn1 + (1  )pn1  (1  )
p0
q0
:
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
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[Figure 2]
The downward-sloping lines passing through the origin labeled Leverage constraint in period
1 and state b and Leverage constraint in period 1 and state n in Figure 2 illustrate the inequality
(20). If the inequality (21) holds, Leverage constraint in period 1 and state b is located above
Leverage constraint in period 0 and below Dividend constraint in period 0. At the same time,
Leverage constraint in period 1 and state n is located below Leverage constraint in period 0.
Thus, as long as the nancial intermediaries choose a positive s1, the leverage constraints would
never bind in state n.
Now, we can determine the optimal portfolio that the nancial intermediaries choose in period
0.
Lemma 4 If inequality (21) holds, the optimal portfolio that the nancial intermediaries choose
in period 0 is written as: s1 = ~s

1 and f

1 =
~f1 , where,
~s1 
1

(p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0
p0
; (22)
~f1   
1  

(p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0
q0
: (23)
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
The intuition behind Lemma 4 is as follows. To determine the portfolio choices of the nancial
intermediaries, we must analyze how their market value changes as s1 and f

1 change. Whereas
a change in the risk-free bonds, f1 , does not aect the market value, a change in the equity
shares, s1, does. For a given f

1 , s
j
2 , f
j
2 , an increase in the equity shares, s

1, by one decreases
the dividend payment in period 0, D0, by p0 but increases the dividend payment in period 1,
Dj1, by p
n
1 + d
n
1 in state n and by p
b
1 + d
b
1 in state b. Therefore, the expected present market
value of the increase in the dividend payment in period 1 is (1  )n1 (pn1 + dn1 ) + b1(pb1 + db1).
Subtracting p0 from (1   )n1 (pn1 + dn1 ) + b1(pb1 + db1) yields b1(pb1   ~b2db2). As explained in
Appendix A.4 we can prove that pb1 >
~b2d
b
2. That is, the nancial intermediaries will increase
their market value by raising their equity shares as much as possible. However, the dividend
and leverage constraints limit the holding of equity shares, s1. As a result, the intermediaries
choose the portfolio at the point of intersection of Leverage constraint in period 0 and Dividend
constraint in period 0 shown in Figure 2.
Following a similar procedure to the derivations of (18) and (19), we can determine the range
of portfolio sj2 and f
j
2 that the nancial intermediaries can choose in period 1 and state j.
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Figure 3 displays this portfolio on a plane, where the horizontal axis is sj2 and the vertical axis
is fj2 . By substituting the budget constraints, (5), into the leverage constraints, (8), and the
dividend constraints, (9), we can derive the following constraints:
fj2   (1  )
p1
q1
sj2 : (24)
fj2   
pj1
qj1
sj2 +
(pj1 + d
j
1)s

1 + f

1
qj1
: (25)
The downward-sloping lines labeled Leverage constraint in period 1 and state j and Dividend
constraint in period 1 and state j in Figure 3 illustrate the relationship.
The downward-sloping line passing through the origin labeled Dividend constraint in period 2
in Figure 3 illustrates the following relationship: Incorporating the budget constraint in period
2, (6), into the dividend constraint in period 2, (9), we acquire the following constraints:
fj2   dj2sj2: (26)
Note that qj1d
j
2  pj1 implies that dj2  p
j
1
qj1
> (1   )pj1
qj1
. Figure 3 illustrates how the constraints
(24) (25) and (26) are related.
[Figure 3]
Now, we can determine the portfolio in period 1, sn2 , f
n
2 , s
b
2 , and f
b
2 .
Lemma 5 If the inequality (21) holds, the optimal portfolios that the nancial intermediaries
choose in period 1 are sn2 = ~s

1 and f
n
2 = 0 in state nl and s
b
2 = ~s
b
2 and f
b
2 =
~fb2 in state b,
where
~sb2 =
1
pb1
pb1 + db1
p0
  1  
q0

(p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0

; (27)
~fb2 =  
1  
qb1
pb1 + db1
p0
  1  
q0

(p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0

: (28)
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The intuition behind Lemma 5 is as follows. A one unit increase in fb2 brings about a
decrease in the dividend payment in period 1 by qb1, but an increase in the dividend payment
in period 2 by one, which is translated into present market value using the SDF, M b2 . The
nancial intermediaries would like to lower fb2 because Assumption 3 ensures that q
b
1  M b2 .
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For a given sb2 , the nancial intermediaries choose the portfolio on the line of the Leverage
constraint in period 1 in Figure 3. Suppose that the nancial intermediaries reduce dividend
payments by one unit in period 1, issue 1   1 units of the risk-free bonds fb2 , and buy 1 units
of the equity shares, sb2 . They can raise
1

db2
pb1
    1   1 1qb1 units of dividend payment in period
2. If the present market value from such leveraged investment is higher than one, the nancial
intermediaries will raise their holdings of equity shares as much as possible. They prefer such a
leveraged investment portfolio because Assumption 3 ensures that M b2
h
1

db2
pb1
    1   1 1qb1 i  1.
As a result, the intermediaries choose the investment portfolio at the point of intersection of the
Leverage constraint in period 1 and the Dividend constraint in period 1, as shown in Figure 3.
The inequality (21) ensures that the leverage constraints in period 1 bind only in state b. In this
case, the nancial intermediaries would not change their portfolio in period 1 and state n. Thus,
the nancial intermediaries set sn2 equal to ~s

1. Because the prices of the risk-free bonds are
determined by qn1 = 
u0(cn2 )
u0(cn1 )
= 
u0(yn2 )
u0(yn1 )
, there is no demand for safe assets from the households
or the nancial intermediary. Thus, fn2 = 0 must hold.
4.3 Equilibrium
Using the asset prices and portfolio derived above, we can characterize the competitive equi-
librium. From the market-clearing conditions for equity shares and risk-free bonds in period
0 and the nancial intermediaries' portfolios, (22) and (23), we use ~s1 and ~f1 to denote the
equilibrium equity shares and risk-free bonds, respectively, held by the households in period 1,
where ~s1 = 1   ~sb1 and ~f1 =   ~fb1 . From the rst-order conditions for the equity shares of
the households, we let ~sb2h and ~s
b
2l denote the equilibrium equity shares for the high- and low-
endowment households, respectively, where ~sb2h = ~s1+
1
a
 b2hdb2
pb1
  1 and ~sb2l = ~s1+ 1a b2ldb2pb1   1.
Note that the equity prices, pb1, dened in (15) are derived from the market-clearing conditions
for the equity shares in period 1 and state b. From the market-clearing conditions for risk-free
bonds in period 1 and state b and the nancial intermediaries' portfolio, (28), we use ~f b2h and
~f b2l
to denote the equilibrium risk-free bonds for high- and low-endowment households, respectively,
where ~f b2h =  
~fb2
1  and
~f b2l = 0. In addition, note that D0 = 0, D
b
1 = 0, and D
b
2 = d
b
2~s
b
2 +
~fb2 .
10
Using the equilibrium portfolio choices and dividend payments from the nancial intermedi-
aries dened above, we can transform the budget constraints for high-endowment households as
10Dn1 and D
n
2 are also determined as follows: D
n
1 =

1

dn1
p0
    1

 1) 1
q0

(p0+d0)s0+ f

0

and Dn1 =
dn2
p0

(p0+
d0)s0 + f

0

. However, they are irrelevant in solving the competitive equilibrium.
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follows:
cb1h   db1   eb1h +
1
a
(qb1d
b
2   pb1) + d1~s1 + ~f1  
qb1
~fb2
1   = 0; (29)
and cb2h   eb2h   db2 +
db2
apb1
(qb1d
b
2   pb1) + db2(~s1   ~sb2 ) +
 
1   
~fb2 = 0: (30)
It is convenient to use the following consumption shares for household h, which are derived
from the goods-market-clearing conditions in periods 1 and 2 in state b, (10) and (11): 1 
(1  )cb1h
yb1
and 2  (1  )c
b
2h
yb2
. Note that consumption is written as follows: cb1h = 1y
b
1(1    ) 1,
cb1l = (1   1)yb1  1, cb2h = 2yb2(1    ) 1, and cb2l = (1   2)yb2  1. According to Lemmas 4
and 5, ~s0, ~f

0 , ~s
b
2 , and
~fb2 depend on p0, q0, q
b
1, and p
b
1. According to Lemma 1, p
b
1 depends
on pb1. Because p0, q0, q
b
1, p
b
1, and p
b
1 depend on c
b
1h, c
b
1l, c
b
2h, and c
b
2l, these prices depend on
the consumption shares, 1 and 2. Therefore, the left-hand sides of (29) and (30) depend on 1
and 2. Hereafter, we denote the left-hand sides of (29) and (30) as 
1(1; 2) and 
2(1; 2).
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Furthermore, we denote asset prices as functions of 1 and 2: p0(1; 2), q0(1; 2), q
b
1(1; 2),
and pb1(1; 2), p
b
1(1; 2).
The following proposition states the conditions under which re sales occur in an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Fire sales occur in equilibrium if consumption shares, 1 and 2, satisfy the
following conditions:

1(1; 2) = 0; (31)

2(1; 2) = 0; (32)
p0(1; 2)
q0(1; 2)
  d
b
1
1   > p1(1; 2)
> (1  )
n
1 +
a


(p0(1; 2) + d0)s

0 + f

0
ohp0(1; 2)
q0(1; 2)
  d
b
1
1  
i
; (33)
and 1 > 1 > 2 > 1   : (34)
Consumption shares, prices, and portfolio choices associated with such values of 1 and 2 con-
stitute the competitive equilibrium where the leverage constraints bind in period 1 and state b.
Proof. The left-hand sides of (31) and (32) represent excess demand functions for the goods
market in periods 1 and 2, as dened on the left-hand sides of (29) and (30). The rst inequality
in (33) is derived from (21) in Lemma 3; it ensures that the leverage constraints bind in state b
but not in state n in period 1. The second inequality in (33) is derived from (16) in Lemma 1; it
11
1(1; 2) and 
2(1; 2) are listed in Appendix A.6.
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ensures that the equilibrium equity price in period 1 and state b is unique. The inequality (34),
derived from Assumption 2, ensures that the high-endowment households have higher IMRS
between periods 1 and 2 in state b than do the low-endowment households. (Q.E.D.)
The case of quadratic utility Proposition 1 argues that the competitive equilibrium in
which the nancial intermediaries conduct re sales exists under certain conditions. However,
the conditions are quite complex. Thus, we examine the case of quadratic utility to acquire
closed-form conditions for the existence of the competitive equilibrium. In the case where the
utility function is specied as a quadratic function, u(c) =  2 c2 + c, where  and  are
parameters.
There is no precautionary demand for assets and the households' consumption distributions
do not aect the asset prices ex ante. That is, q0 and p0 are independent of 1 and 2. Therefore,
the inequality (33) indicates that pb1(1; 2) has constant upper and lower bounds, as follows:
p0
q0
  d
b
1
1   > p
b
1(1; 2) > (1  )
n
1 +
a


(p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0
ohp0
q0
  d
b
1
1  
i
:
The market-clearing conditions for goods in period 1, 
1(1; 2) = 0, are written as:
A1
3
1 +B1
2
2 +  11 +112 + E12 + Z1 = 0; (35)
where the coecients, A1, B1,  1, 1, E1, and Z1 are dened in the Appendix A.7. Note that
these coecients do not depend on either 1 or 2. The market-clearing conditions for the goods
market in period 2 and state b, 
2(1; 2) = 0, are written as follows:
A2(1)
3
2 +B2(1)
2
2 +  2(1)2 +2(1) = 0; (36)
where the coecients A2(1), B2(1),  2(1), and 2(1) are dened in Appendix A.7.
We can derive sucient conditions for the existence of the competitive equilibrium where the
nancial intermediaries' leverage constraints bind in period 1 and state b.
Proposition 2 In the case of quadratic utility, the competitive equilibrium exists under certain
conditions.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
20
The case of constant relative risk aversion utility In the case of constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility, u(c) = c
1  1
1  , where  is the coecient of the relative risk aversion or
the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticities of substitution. The marginal utility is written as
u0(c) = c . Because the market-clearing conditions are quite complex, it is dicult to discuss
the existence of the competitive equilibrium using closed-form conditions. Thus, we compute the
competitive equilibrium numerically, and conrm that the equilibrium uniquely exists.
5 Results and Discussion
We conduct numerical computations to understand the qualitative implications of our model,
rather than as an attempt to match data quantitatively. The computational algorithm is based
on Proposition 1. We conrm the existence and uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium. To
aid understanding of the model implications, we present the results from the representative agent
(RA) model. In this case, the idiosyncratic endowment shocks are perfectly shared: 1 = 2 =
0:5.
5.1 Calibration Parameters
Table 1 presents the basic calibration parameters: the time discount factor, , is 0.94; the coe-
cient of adjustment costs of equity transactions, a, is 1; the probability of the aggregate economy
being in a bad state, , is 0.1; and the probability of a household having a low endowment,  ,
is 0.5. Idiosyncratic shocks drive period 1's endowment down to eb1l = 0:6, but otherwise labor
endowments are 0.7. Dividends from the Lucas trees fall to db1 = 0:03 in period 1 and state b, but
otherwise they are 0.3. That is, the aggregate endowments, y0, y
n
1 , y
n
2 , and y
b
2 are set to 1 but y
b
1
is set to 0.68. In state b and period 1, the dividends from Lucas trees decrease by 90% and the
endowments of the low-endowment household decrease by 14%. The initial holdings of equity
shares by the nancial intermediaries, s0, are set to 0.01, and the risk-free bonds, f

0 , are set to
0. The utility functions are specied in terms of quadratic utility, u(c) =   c22 +1:75c, or CRRA,
u(c) = c
1 1:1
1 1:1 . These values are chosen so that the risk-free rates and the equity premiums in the
RA model with CRRA utility equal about 0.01 and 0.03, respectively.
[Table 1]
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5.2 Asset Prices and Portfolio
Figure 4 presents the asset prices and portfolio results in the case of quadratic utility and Figure
5 presents those in the case of CRRA utility. In each gure, Panel A presents \the equity price
to fundamental price ratio", which is calculated as pb1=q
b
1d
b
2; Panel B presents the risk-free rates,
Rf  1=q0; Panel C presents the equity premiums, Re  Rf , where the expected equity returns,
Re, are calculated as Re  (1   )(pn1 + dn1 )=p0 + (pb1 + db1)=p0; and Panel D presents the
volatilities in equity prices, which are calculated as

(1 )[(pn1   p1)=p0]2+[(pb1  p1)=p0]2
	 1
2 ,
where p0  (1   )pn1 + pb1. Panel E presents the risk-free bonds issued by the nancial
intermediaries in periods 0 and 1, which equal f1 and f
b
2 , respectively; and Panel F presents
the ow of the equity shares traded by nancial intermediaries in periods 0 and 1, s1   s0 and
sb2   s1, and those traded by the high- and low-endowment households, respectively, in period
1, (1    )(sb2h   s1) and  (sb2l   s1). Each panel reports results where the margin requirement
ratio, , takes a value between 0.6 and 0.9.
Figure 4 reports results in the case of quadratic utility. First, Panel A demonstrates that
the equity price to fundamental price ratio takes values lower than one, whereas it takes a
value of one in the RA. The decrease in  enables the nancial intermediaries to issue risk-free
bonds and buy more shares of Lucas trees. Thus, such leveraged investment by the nancial
intermediaries causes a severe fall in equity prices in period 1 and state b associated with re
sales. Second, Panel B demonstrates that the risk-free rates in our model are the same as those
in the RA model. Due to the absence of the precautionary saving motive, the expected IMRS
between periods 0 and 1 are equal to those of the representative agent. As a result, p0 and q0
are independent of the consumption distribution. Finally, Panels C and D demonstrate that the
equity premiums decrease and the expected volatilities increase as  decreases. In particular,
the equity premiums in our model are lower than those in the RA when  is below 0.85. Because
q0 and p0 are constant, a decrease in p
b
1 directly decreases the expected equity returns and the
equity premiums. This is consistent with the arguments by Mankiw (1986): If investors do not
have a precautionary saving motive, the concentration of aggregate risks cannot generate large
equity premiums. In our model, a decrease in the equity returns due to re sales reduces the
equity premiums. Note that Panels E and F are similar to the case of CRRA utility. We will
explain them later.
Figure 5 shows the results in the case of CRRA utility, where asset prices are aected by the
precautionary saving motive. We begin by explaining the results of asset prices using Panels A,
B, C, and D. First, Panel A demonstrates that the decrease in  decreases the equity price to the
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fundamental price ratio, as in the case of quadratic utility. Second, Panel B demonstrates that
the risk-free rates increase as  decreases from 0.9 to 0.75, but they decrease as  decreases from
0.75 to 0.6. Such an inverse U-shape occurs because of the following two opposite eects. On
the one hand, a decrease in  enables the nancial intermediaries to issue more risk-free bonds.
The risk-free bonds serve as self-insurance for households against their idiosyncratic endowment
shocks. Therefore, a decrease in  mitigates precautionary demands for assets and raises the
risk-free rates. On the other hand, a decrease in  exaggerates a decline in equity prices because
of re sales. The low-endowment households suer from re sales because they have to sell their
equity shares to raise their period 1 consumption. Hence, re sales increase the consumption
disparity between high- and low-endowment households in period 1 and state b, they magnify the
precautionary demands for assets, and lower the risk-free rates. As the latter eects dominate the
former, the risk-free rates decrease as  decreases from 0.75 to 0.6. Then, Panel C demonstrates
that the equity premium decreases as  decreases from 0.9 to 0.6. These values are higher than
those of the RA model as long as  is higher than about 0.7. Labor endowments are exposed
to uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks and such uninsured idiosyncratic shocks correlate with the
aggregate shocks. As explained by Mankiw (1986), because such correlation implies that holding
equity shares is risky, the equity premium is higher than that in the RA model. However, equity
premiums are lower than those of the RA model when  is lower than 0.7. This is because re
sales induce a decrease in the expected equity returns that is much more severe than the decrease
in the risk-free rates. Panel D demonstrates that the expected volatilities of the equity prices
increase as  decreases, as in the case of quadratic utility.
Panels E and F show the portfolio results and conrm that asset prices are actually related
to the balance sheets of nancial intermediaries. Panel E shows the risk-free bonds issued by the
nancial intermediaries. Note that the holdings of risk-free bonds by households in period 0 are
f1 =  f1 ; in period 1, high-endowment households in period 1 hold (1   )f b2h =  f2 and low-
endowment households hold  f b2l = 0. Both f

1 and f
b
2 take negative values because nancial
intermediaries issue risk-free bonds, f1 monotonically decreases as  decreases, f
b
2 decreases as
 decreases from 0.9 to 0.75, but increases as  decreases from 0.75 to 0.6, and fb2 is higher than
f1 . Panel F shows that the equity shares purchased by the nancial intermediaries take positive
values in period 0 but negative values in period 1. In addition, the absolute values of equity
shares purchased (sold) increase as  decreases. These results conrm that the balance sheets of
nancial intermediaries expand in period 0 but shrink in period 1 and state b. Such a shrinkage
in the balance sheets is considered to indicate re sales because it is associated with a decline in
23
equity prices from their fundamental values, as shown in Panel A. Note that the equity shares
purchased by the high-endowment households increase as  decreases. On the other hand, the
equity shares sold by the low-endowment household decrease as  decreases.
These results are insightful in terms of the disaster explanations of asset prices. The model
with CRRA utility successfully generates low risk-free rates, large equity premiums, and high
expected volatilities in equity returns or prices compared with the RA model as long as  is
higher than about 0.7. The original disaster models proposed by Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006)
argue that high equity premiums occur even in the RA framework, where the equity prices
maintain their fundamental values. Our results demonstrate that not only equity premiums but
also the volatilities of equity returns can take higher values than those of the representative
agent. Therefore, the noted link between leverage and re sales during nancial crises may, at
least qualitatively, resolve both the equity premium puzzles and the excess volatility puzzles.
[Figure 4]
[Figure 5]
5.3 Consumption Risk Sharing
Figure 6 presents the consumption risk sharing and welfare based on quadratic utility and Fig-
ure 7 presents those based on CRRA utility. These gures demonstrate that there is no large
dierence in the qualitative features of the quadratic and CRRA utility models.
Panel A of each gure shows the consumption shares of high-endowment households in state b
in period 1, 1, and period 2, 2, when  equals 0.6, 0.625,    , 0.9. 1 decreases but 2 increases
as  declines from 0.9 to 0.75, whereas 1 increases but 2 decreases as  declines from 0.75 to
0.6. The relationship between 1 and 2 is drawn as a curve. In particular, the slope of the curve
between  = 0:9 and 0:75 is steeper than that between  = 0:75 and 0.6. It is convenient to
separate the eects of a decrease in  on 1 and 2 into two components. First, a decrease in 
allows the nancial intermediaries to issue more risk-free bonds, which are held by households for
self-insurance in period 0. It enables the low-endowment households to successfully raise their
consumption and reduce the amount of equity shares sold in period 1. Thus, 1 decreases and 2
increases. Second, a decrease in  implies a sharp decline in equity prices due to re sales. Such
re sales prevent low-endowment households from raising their consumption in period 1. That
is, 1 increases and 2 decreases. In particular, because re sales enable the high-endowment
households to buy equity shares at discounted prices, they could raise 2 at less compensations
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in 1. Thus, the more sharply that equity prices fall, the more the second eect dominates the
rst. As a result, 2 increases at less compensations in 1 when  is lower than 0.75.
Panel B shows the ex post welfare measured by the certainty equivalent consumption of high-
endowment households and demonstrates that it monotonically deteriorates as  decreases. As
shown in Panel A, a decrease in  from 0.9 to 0.75 mitigates the dispersion in consumption of
the two types of households in period 1. Note that the marginal utility of the high-endowment
households is lower than that of low-endowment households in period 1. This reduction in the
disparity in consumption levels between low- and high-endowment households has a relatively
negligible impact on the welfare of the high-endowment households. On the other hand, as
shown in Panel F of Figure 4 and 5, the high-endowment households incur the costs of the re
sales by the nancial intermediaries. As a result, the welfare of the high-endowment households
monotonically decreases.
Panel C shows the ex post welfare of the low-endowment households, which improves as 
decreases from 0.9 to 0.75 but deteriorates as  decreases from 0.75 to 0.6. As shown in Panel
F in Figure 4 and 5, a decrease in  enables the low-endowment households to avoid paying
adjustment costs in period 1. As shown in Panel A, the disparity in consumption for the two
types of households in period 1 is mitigated as  decreases from 0.9 to 0.75. Thus, the low-
endowment households' welfare is improved as  decreases from 0.9 to 0.75. On the other hand,
the dispersion is signicantly enlarged as  decreases from 0.75 to 0.6. Because the loss from
the decrease in period 1 consumption dominates the gain from avoiding the adjustment costs,
welfare deteriorates as  decreases from 0.75 to 0.6.
Panel D demonstrates that the ex ante welfare displays an inverse U-shape; it increases
as  declines from 0.9 to 0.75 but decreases as  declines from 0.75 to 0.6. This result is
naturally derived from the interaction of the dierent ex post welfare results for the high- and
low-endowment households.
[Figure 6]
[Figure 7]
Taken together, the numerical results demonstrate that there is a trade-o for the nancial
intermediaries between the ex ante self-insurance opportunities derived from expanding their
balance sheets and the costly ex post nancial instabilities arising from re sales. If  is in the
moderate range (from 0.9 to 0.75), then mitigating the leverage constraints raises the ex ante
welfare due to improvements in the welfare of low-endowment households. On the other hand,
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if  takes a suciently low value ( from 0.75 to 0.6), the ex ante welfare worsens as the welfare
of both household types deteriorates. In other words, there is an optimal level for the margin
requirement ratio to maximize ex ante welfare. However, note that it is only high-endowment
households who absorb the costs of re sales.
6 Conclusion
The contribution of our paper is to demonstrate that countercyclical idiosyncratic endowment
risks and market incompleteness give rise to leverage by nancial intermediaries and cause re
sales in a competitive equilibrium. If the margin requirement constraint is in the moderate range
specied, our model successfully generates lower risk-free rates, larger equity premiums, and
higher expected volatilities in equity returns compared with the RA model. At the same time,
if the margin requirement constraint is in the moderate range, the mitigation of the leverage
constraints raises the ex ante welfare. However, if the margin requirement constraint takes
already suciently mitigated, it worsens the ex ante welfare.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The rst-order conditions with respect to the equity shares, sn2 , s
b
2h, and s
b
2l are s
n
2 = s1 +
1
a

n2 d
b
2
pb1
 1

and sb2i = s1+
1
a

b2id
b
2
pb1
 1

, where i = h and l. From the market-clearing condition
(12), we can derive the following \equity supply function" for the nancial intermediaries.
sj2 = s

1  
1
a
 pj1
pj1
  1

(37)
If equity prices are determined as pj1 = p
b
1, there is no supply of equity shares for the nancial
intermediaries, that is, sj2 = s

1 holds.
Suppose that the nancial intermediaries' net assets evaluated at the equity prices pj1 are not
sucient to enable them to satisfy the leverage constraint, pay dividends, and maintain their
current holding of equity, sj2 = s

1; that is, when
1


(pj1 + d
j
1)s

1 + f
j
1 +D
j
1
  pj1s1, they must
reduce their dividends to zero. Nevertheless, the leverage constraints under the equity prices still
bind, that is, when 1

(pj1 + d
j
1)s

1 + f
j
1
  pj1s1, they must shed securities to the point where
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they are just able to satisfy the leverage constraints:
1


(pj1 + d
j
1)s

1 + f
j
1

= pj1s
j
2 ; (38)
where sj2 < s
j
1 . As it is costly for the households to absorb the equity shares, p
j
1 will drop
below pj1. By inverting (38), we obtain the following \equity demand function" for the nancial
intermediaries in the regime where the leverage constraints bind.
sj2 =
1
pj1

(pj1 + d
j
1)s

1 + f
j
1

(39)
For the leverage constraints to bind, the nancial intermediaries must be unable to cover their
debt obligations simply with their dividend earnings. Therefore, the term dj1s
j
1 + f

1 is negative.
In this instance, equation (39) implies that the nancial intermediaries' demand for equity is
upward sloping in prices.
Figure 8 illustrates the equilibrium. From equation (37), the supply curve is written as
pj1 =
pj1
1 a(sj2  s1)
. It is positioned so that pj1 = p
j
1 when s
j
2 = s

1. The gure also portrays the
upward-sloping demand curve, pj1 =  d
j
1s

1+f

1
s1 sj2
derived from equation (39). When the leverage
constraints bind, the demand curve is to the left of the supply curve at pj1 = p
j
1. In this instance,
when pj1 = p
j
1, the maximum feasible number of shares that the nancial intermediaries can hold
is less than s1. Given the position of the demand curve, the equilibrium lies at a point where p
j
1
is below pj1 and s
j
2 is below s

1. Equation (15) follows directly from equations (37) and (39). As
displayed in Figure 8, there is a unique intersection of the supply and demand curves ((37 and
39, respectively) if and only if the condition (16) holds. (Q.E.D.)
[Figure 8]
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From (14) the following inequality holds: qb1 = 
u0(cb2h)
u0(cb1h)
 
h
(1    )u0(cb2h)
u0(cb1h)
+  
u0(cb2l)
u0(cb1l)
i
= b2.
Proving b2  ~b2 is straightforward. We can demonstrate that  u
0(cb2h)
u0(cb1h)
  u0(cb2l)
u0(cb1l)
) b2  ~b2:
We dene the following notation: m1h  u0(cb1h), m1l  u0(cb1l), m2h  u0(cb2h), and m2l 
u0(cb2l). 
u0(cb2h)
u0(cb1h)
  u0(cb2l)
u0(cb1l)
implies that m2hm1h  m2lm1l , m2hm1h (m1l   m1h)  m2lm1l (m1l   m1h)
, m2hm1h (m1l  m1h) + m2lm1l (m1h  m1l)  0 , m2hm1l(m1l  m1h) +m2lm1h(m1h  m1l)  0
, m2h(m1l)2 + m2l(m1h)2  (m2h + m2l)m1hlm1l , m2h m1lm1h + m2l m1hm1l  m2h + m2l ,
  (1  )m2h  (1  )m2l+ (1  )m2h m1lm1h + (1  )m2l m1hm1l  0 , (1  )2m2h+ (1 
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 )m2h
m1l
m1h
+ (1  )m2l m1hm1l + 2m2l  (1  )m2h+ m2l , (1  )m2hm1h

(1  )m1h+ m1l

+
 m2lm1l

(1    )m1h +  m1l
  (1    )m2h +  m2l , (1    )m2hm1h +  m2lm1l    (1  )m2h+ m2l(1  )m1h+ m1l
(Q.E.D.)
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
To prove that (1  )p0q0 > db1 + (1  )pb1 ) dn1 + (1  )pn1  (1  )
p0
q0
holds, it is sucient to
demonstrate that (1  )p0q0 > db1 + (1  )pb1 ^ (1  )
p0
q0
> dn1 + (1  )pn1 is a contradiction.
Assume that b2  ~b2 +  ( > 0). If both inequalities hold, the following inequality must hold:
b1(1 )p0q0 > b1

db1+(1 )( ~b2+)db2
	 ^ (1 )n1 (1 )p0q0 > (1 )n1 dn1+(1 )n2 dn2	,
b1(1 )p0q0 > b1

(1 )db1+db1+(1 )( ~b2+ )db2
	 ^ (1 )n1 (1 )p0q0 > (1 )n1 (1 
)dn1 + d
n
1 + (1   )n2 dn2
	
. However, the sums of the inequalities imply that (1   )p0 >
(1 )p0+ (1 )b1db2+

b1d
b
1+(1 )n1 dn1
, 0 > (1 )b1db2+b1db1+(1 )n1 dn1 .
Because the right-hand side is positive, the above inequality is a contradiction. (Q.E.D.)
Note that (1  )p0q0 < db1 + (1  )pb1 ^ (1  )
p0
q0
< dn1 + (1  )pn1 is not a contradiction.
Therefore, (1  )p0q0 > db1 + (1  )pb1 ( dn1 + (1  )pn1  (1  )
p0
q0
does not hold.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Using the budget constraints (4), (5), and (6), the nancial intermediaries' value, (3), can be
written as follows:
VFI  (p0 + d0)s0 + f0  
n
p0  

(1  )n1 (pn1 + dn1 ) + b1(pb1 + db1)
o
s1
 
n
q0  

(1  )n1 + b1
o
f1   (1  )n1 (pn1   n2 dn2 )sn2
 (1  )n1 (qn1   n2 )fn2   b1(pb1  M b2db2)sb2   b1(qb1  M b2)fb2 : (40)
The eects of marginal changes of s1 and f

1 on the nancial intermediaries' values, VFI , can
be written as follows: @VFI@s1
= (1   )n1 (pn1   n2 dn2 ) + b1(pb1   ~b2db2) and @VFI@f1 = 0. If the
inequality (21) holds, we can prove that pb1 <
~b2d
b
2 is a contradiction. If p
b
1 <
~b2d
b
2, the nancial
intermediaries would like to decrease the holdings of equity shares. In this case, s1 take a negative
value. As displayed in Figure 2, the leverage constraints do not bind in state b and period 1 if
s1 < 0. Then, the equity prices must be p
b
1 = 
b
2d
b
2. However, Lemma 2 argues that 
b
2  ~b2,
pb1 <
~b2d
b
2 is a contradiction in equilibrium. Therefore, the equity prices in state b and period
1 should be pb1  ~b2db2. Thus, it implies that @VFI@s1  0 holds and the nancial intermediaries
raise their equity shares as high as they can. As a result, the intermediaries choose the point
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of intersection of the Leverage constraint in period 0 and the Dividend constraint in period 0
displayed in Figure 2. (Q.E.D.)
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
From (40), the eects of marginal changes of sj2 and f
j
1 on the nancial intermediaries' values,
VFI , can be written as follows:
@VFI
@sn2
= (1 )n1 (n2 dn2  pn1 ), @VFI@fn2 = 0,
@VFI
@sb2
= b1(M
b
2d
b
2 pb1),
and @VFI
@fb2
= b1(M
b
2   qb1).
When M b2 = q
b
1,
@VFI
@fb2
< 0 and @VFI
@sb2
> 0 hold. That is, both selling the risk-free bonds
and buying the equity shares raises the nancial intermediaries' value. In this case, the optimal
portfolio occurs at the point of intersection between the Leverage constraint in period 1and the
Dividend constraint in period 1 in Figure 3.
When M b2 < q
b
1,
@VFI
@fb2
< 0 holds. That is, because selling the risk-free bonds increases
the nancial intermediaries' value and the leverage constraint in period 1 binds. On the one
hand, if M2d
b
2  pb1, the optimal portfolio is at the point of intersection between the Leverage
constraint in period 1 and the Dividend constraint in period 1 in Figure 3. On the other hand,
if M2d
b
2  pb1 holds, selling both the risk-free bonds and the equity shares raises the nancial
intermediaries' value. If the following inequality holds, the nancial intermediaries prefer selling
the risk-free bonds to selling the equity shares: @VFI
@sb2
  (1  )pb1
qb1
@VFI
@fb2
> 0 ) b1pb1
h
Mb2d
b
2
pb1
  1 
(1   )Mb2 qb1
qb1
i
> 0. The term in parentheses, [], is positive if the following inequality holds:
M b2 > 
b
2


db2
pb1
  1 
qb1
 1
. In this case, the optimal portfolio is at the point of intersection of the
Leverage constraint in period 1 and the Dividend constraint in period 1 in Figure 3. Assumption
3 ensures that the SDF, M b2 , is higher than 
b
2
.
The above arguments demonstrate that, regardless of the sign of M b2d
b
2   pb1, the optimal
portfolio is at the point of intersection between the Leverage constraint in period 1 and the
Dividend constraint in period 1 in Figure 3. Therefore, the optimal portfolio that the nancial
intermediaries choose in period 1 and state b is written as sb2 = ~s
b
2 and f
b
2 =
~fb2 , where
~sb2 
1

(pb1 + d
b
1)s

1 + f

1
pb1
(41)
~fb2   
1  

(pb1 + d
b
1)s

1 + f

1
qb1
: (42)
The inequality (21) ensures that the leverage constraints in period 1 bind only in state b.
In this case, the nancial intermediaries would not change their portfolio in period 1 and state
n. Thus, the nancial intermediaries set sn2 equal to ~s

1. Because the prices of the risk-free
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bonds are determined by qn1 = 
u0(cn2 )
u0(cn1 )
= 
u0(yn2 )
u0(yn1 )
, there is no demand for safe assets from the
households or the nancial intermediary. Thus, fn2 = 0 must hold. Using (41), (42), (22), and
(23), ~sb2 and ~f
b
2 can be written as in (27) and (28). (Q.E.D.)
A.6 Derivation of (29) and (30)
Using the optimal holdings of risk-free bonds, (22), (23), and (28), the sum of the fth, sixth,
and seventh terms on the left-hand side of equation (29) is written as follows:
db1s
b
1 + f

1   qb1
1
1   f

2 =
h (1  )pb1 + (1   )db1
(1   )2p0  
(1  )(1   )
(1   )2q0
i
(p0 + d0)s

0 + f

0

: (43)
Using (43) and cb1h =
1y
b
1
1  , and replacing p0, p
b
1, q0, q
b
1 with p0(1; 2), p
b
1(1; 2), q0(1; 2),
qb1(1; 2), we can dene the left-hand side of equation (29) as follows:

1(1; 2)  1y
b
1
1     d
b
1   eb1h +
1
a

qb1(1; 2)d
b
2   pb1(1; 2)

+
h 1   
(1   )2 d
b
1 +
1  
(1   )2 p
b
1(1; 2) 
(1  )(1   )
(1   )2
p0(1; 2)
q0(1; 2)
i
s0 +
d0s

0 + f

0
p0(1; 2)

:
Using the optimal level of risk-free bonds, (22), (27), and (28), the sum of the fth and sixth
terms on the left-hand side of equation (30) is written as follows:
db2(s
b
1  sb2 )+
 
1   f
b
2 =
h db2
p0
 
 db2
pb1
+
 (1  )
(1   )qb1
pb1 + db1
p0
 1  
q0
i
(p0+d0)s

0+f

0

: (44)
Using (44) and cb2h =
2y
b
2
1  , and replacing p0, p
b
1, q0, q
b
1 with p0(1; 2), p
b
1(1; 2), q0(1; 2),
qb1(1; 2), we can dene the left-hand side of equation (30) as follows:

2(1; 2)  2y
b
2
1   +
1  a
a

db2   eb2h  
qb1(1; 2)(d
b
2)
2
apb1(1; 2)
 
n db2
pb1(1; 2)
+
 (1  )
(1   )qb1(1; 2)
h
pb1(1; 2) + d
b
1   (1  )
p0(1; 2)
q0(1; 2)
i
  db2
o
 1


s0 +
d0s

0 + f

0
p0(1; 2)

:
Note that the equity prices in period 1 and state b can be written as follows:
pb1(1; 2) =
pb1(1; 2) +
a

h
db1   (1  )p0(1;2)q0(1;2)
i 
s0 +
d0s

0+f

0
p0(1;2)

  a 1 
 
s0 +
d0s0+f

0
p0(1;2)
 :
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A.7 Denition of the Coecients of (35) and (36)
The market-clearing condition for the goods market in period 1, 
1(1; 2) = 0, is written as
(35), where the coecients are as follows:
A1    
2yb31
 (1   )2 ;
B1 

m
n


yb1 + (1   )(db1 + eb1h)

+ (1  2 )
o
  (1  ) (+ ax)wx
 yb21
(1   )2m;
 1 

  (1   )ma(yb1    ) +  db2

(1  )x  (1   )2(yb2    ) + 2(1   )2	
 a(1   )m(db1 + eb1h)  (1  ) (+ ax)wxyb1 + (1  2 ) yb1 (1   )2am;
1 =   (1  )xd
b
2
2yb1y
b
2
am(1   )2 ;
E1 =

2(yb1   ) + (1  )x
 db2yb2
am(1   ) ;
and Z1 =
n
 db2

2(1   )(yb2   yb1)  (1  )x(yb2    )

+

(1   )am(db1 + eb1h)  a(1  ) (+ ax)wx

(yb1    )
o 
 (1   )am:
Note that w, x, and m are parameters dened as follows: w  db1   (1  )p0q0 , x  s0 +
d0s

0+f

0
p0
,
and m  2   a(1  )x.
The market-clearing condition for the goods market in period 2 and state b, 
2(1; 2) = 0, is
written as (36), where the coecients A2(1), B2(1),  2(1), and 2(1) are dened as follows:
A2(1)  
23yb1y
b3
2 
2db2
(1   )2 m
 1
1     1
yb1
 
1   y
b
1
 
+ 
i
;
B2(1)  y
b
2
(1   )2m
h
  wax

  y
b
2
1   1 + 
yb2
 
1   y
b
2
 
+ 
2
 (1   ) (1  )2db22 x
1
m

  y
b
2
1   1 + 
2
 db2

2(1   )2   (1   )2n   (1  )xdb2
m
  mdb2
a
	yb2
 
1   y
b
2
 
+ 
2
+2db2
n
yb2

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(1  2 )
  (1   )n  2 (1  )xdb2
m
o


  y
b
2
1   1 + 
yb2
 
1   y
b
2
 
+ 
i
;
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and 2(1)  1
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Note that n is dened as:
n 
1  a
a
+
x

  x
2

db2   eb2h:
A.8 Proof of Proposition 2
We propose sucient conditions for the existence of the competitive equilibrium under quadratic
utility. Equation (35) can be reformulated as follows:
2 =  A1
3
1 +B1
2
1 +  11 + Z1
11 + E1
: (45)
Because equation (45) is a rational function, it is continuous except at the point where the
denominator equals 0, that is, 1 =  E11 . In addition, dierentiating equation (35) with respect
to 1 yields
@2
@1
=
 2A1131 (2B11+3A1E1)21 2B1E11+Z11 Z1E1
(11+E1)2
. Suppose that @2@1 > (<)0
holds within the range of 1    1  1, it ensures that the excess demand function in period
1 is a monotonically increasing (decreasing) function.
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Because equation (35) is a cubic equation of 1 for a given 2, we can acquire the three
closed-form solutions of 1 for a given 2 by employing Cardano's formula.
12 In particular, (35)
can be written as:
A1
3
1 +B1
2
1 + [ 1 + (1   )1]1 + (1   )E1 + Z1 = 0; (46)
if 2 = 1   , and
A1
3
1 + (B1 +1)
2
1 + [ 1 + E1]1 + E1 + Z1 = 0; (47)
if 2 = 1. We denote the three roots of equation (46) and (47) as 
k
1 and
k1 for k = 1, 2, and
3, respectively. The closed forms of k1 and
k1 are listed in the Appendix A.9. Suppose that a
root takes a real value within the interval [1    ; 1] and let 1 and 1 denote such a real root.
Note that when @2@1 > (<)0 holds and 1 and
1 exists, the excess demand function in period 1
is continuous and monotonically increasing (decreasing) in the region where 1 2 [1    ; 1] and
2 2 [1   ; 1], as plotted in Figure 9.
Because equation (36) is a cubic equation of 2 for a given 1, we can acquire the three
closed-form solutions of 2 as a function of 1 by employing Cardano's formula. Note that the
equation has at least one real solution and that l2(1) is an almost continuous function within
the interval [1;
1] because 
l
2(1) can be expressed as the polynomial of 1. We denote the
three solutions of equation (36) as l2(1), for l = 1; 2; and 3. The closed forms of 
l
2(1) are
listed in the Appendix A.9. Then, we compute l2(1) and 
l
2(
1) and denote them as 
l
2 and
l2,
respectively, if l2(1) and 
l
2(
1) take the real values.
Finally, if (2   1)(2   1) > 0 holds, the equilibrium consumption shares 1 and 2 exist.
Figure 9 illustrates a case where 1 > 1,
1 > 2, and 1 > 2. (Q.E.D.)
[Figure 9]
A.9 Roots of (35) and (36)
Because equation (35) is a cubic equation of 1 for a given 2, we can acquire the three closed-
form solutions of 1 by employing Cardano's formula. Note that it has at least one real solution.
In particular, when 2 = 1   , equation (35) can be written as follows:
A1
3 +B1
2
1 + [ 1 + (1   )1]1 + (1   )E1 + Z1 = 0:
12See Jacobson (2009).
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Using Cardano's formula, the roots of the above cubic equations can be written as follows:
11 =
 
Q2
1
+ 4R31
 1
2 +Q
1
	 1
3
3 2 13A1
  2
1
3R1
3A1
 
Q2
1
+ 4R31
 1
2 +Q
1
	 1
3
  B1
3A1
;
21 =
 (1  ip3) Q2
1
+ 4R31
 1
2 +Q
1
	 1
3
6 2 13A1
+
(1 + i
p
3)2
1
3R1
3 2 23A1
 
Q2
1
+ 4R31
 1
2 +Q
1
	 1
3
  B1
3A1
;
and 31 =
 (1 + ip3) Q2
1
+ 4R31
 1
2 +Q
1
	 1
3
6 2 13A1
+
(1  ip3)2 13R1
3 2 23A1
 
Q2
1
+ 4R31
 1
2 +Q
1
	 1
3
  B1
3A1
;
where Q
1
  27A21[(1    )E1 + Z1] + 9A1B1[ 1 + (1    )1]   2B31 and R1  3A1[ 1 + (1  
 )1] B21 .
On the other hand, when 2 = 1, equation (35) can be written as follows:
A1
3 + (B1 +1)
2
1 + [ 1 + E1]1 + E1 + Z1 = 0:
Using Cardano's formula, the roots of the above cubic equations can be written as follows:
11 =
 
Q21 + 4
R31
 1
2 + Q1
	 1
3
3 2 13A1
  2
1
3 R1
3A1
 
Q21 + 4
R31
 1
2 + Q1
	 1
3
  B1 +1
3A1
;
21 =
 (1  ip3)  Q21 + 4 R31 12 + Q1	 13
6 2 13A1
+
(1 + i
p
3)2
1
3 R1
3 2 23A1
 
Q21 + 4
R31
 1
2 + Q1
	 1
3
  B1 +1
3A1
;
31 =
 (1 + ip3)  Q21 + 4 R31 12 + Q1	 13
6 2 13A1
+
(1  ip3)2 13 R1
3 2 23A1
 
Q21 + 4
R31
 1
2 + Q1
	 1
3
  B1 +1
3A1
;
where Q1   27A21[E1 +Z1] + 9A1(B1 +1)[ 1 +E1]  2(B1 +1)3 and R1  3A1[ 1 +E1] 
(B1 +1)
2.
Because equation (36) is also a cubic equation of 1 for a given 2, we can acquire the three
closed-form solutions of 2 as a function of 1 by employing Cardano's formula. Note that the
equation has at least one real solution. The 2 such that meet equation (36) for a given 1 can
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be written as follows:
12(1) =
 
Q2(1)
2 + 4R2(1)
3
 1
2 +Q2(1)
	 1
3
3 2 13A2(1)
  2
1
3R1(1)
3A2(1)
 
Q2(1)2 + 4R2(1)3
 1
2 +Q2(1)
	 1
3
  B2(1)
3A2(1)
;
22(1) =
 (1  ip3) Q2(1)2 + 4R2(1)3 12 +Q2(1)	 13
6 2 13A2(1)
+
(1 + i
p
3)2
1
3R1(1)
3 2 23A2(1)
 
Q2(1)2 + 4R2(1)3
 1
2 +Q2(1)
	 1
3
  B2(1)
3A2(1)
;
and 32(1) =
 (1 + ip3) Q2(1)2 + 4R2(1)3 12 +Q2(1)	 13
6 2 13A2(1)
+
(1  ip3)2 13R1(1)
3 2 23A2(1)
 
Q2(1)2 + 4R2(1)3
 1
2 +Q2(1)
	 1
3
  B2(1)
3A2(1)
;
whereQ2(1) andR2(1) are given as follows: Q2(1)   27A2(1)22(1)+9A2(1)B2(1) 2(1) 
2B2(1)
3 and R2(1)  3A2(1) 2(1) B1(1)2. Because A2(1), B2(1),  2(1), and 2(1) are
polynomial with respect to 1, Q2(1) and Q2(1) are polynomial and dierentiable with respect
to 1. Then, 2 expressed above is continuous and dierentiable except at the point where 1
meets the following conditions: A2(1) = 0 and
 
Q2(2)
2 + 4R2(2)
3
 1
2 +Q2(2) = 0.
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Table 1: The basic calibration parameters
time discount factor  0.94 e0 0.70 d0 0.30
en1 0.70 d
n
1 0.30
equity adjustment cost a 1.0 en2 0.70 d
n
2 0.30
aggregate prob.  0.1 eb1h 0.70 d
b
1 0.03
idiosyncratic prob.  0.5 eb2h 0.70 d
b
2 0.30
leverage ratio  0.6  0.9 eb1l 0.60 s0 0.01
eb2l 0.70 f

0 0.00
Utility functions are specied as quadratic, u(c) =   c2
2
+ 1:75c, or constant relative risk aversion, u(c) = c
1 1:1
1 1:1 .
Aggregate endowments, y0, yn1 , y
n
2 , y
b
2 are set to 1 but y
b
1 is set to 0.68. In the state b and the period 1, the
dividend from Lucas trees decrease by 90% and endowments of the low-endowment hosehold decreases by 14%.
Figure 1: State
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Figure 2: Feasible portfolio and leverage binding portfolio in period 0
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Figure 3: Feasible portfolio region in period 1 and state j
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Figure 4: Asset prices in the quadratic utility
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Figure 5: Asset prices in the CRRA utility
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Figure 6: Consumption shares and the welfare in the quadratic utility
θ1
0.5322 0.5323 0.5323 0.5324 0.5324
θ
2
0.5046
0.5046
0.5047
0.5047
Panel A. Consumption shares
κ
0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
0.9871
0.9871
0.9871
0.9871
0.9871
0.9871
Panel D. Ex-ante welfare
κ
0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
0.9006
0.9006
0.9006
0.9006
Panel B. Ex-post welfare: high
κ
0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
0.8596
0.8596
0.8596
0.8596
0.8596
0.8597
Panel C. Ex-post welfare: low
κ=0.9
κ=0.8
κ=0.7
κ=0.6
Figure 7: Consumption shares and the welfare in the CRRA utility
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Figure 8: Determination of equilibrium equity prices in period 1 and state j
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Figure 9: Existence of the competitive equilibrium
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